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Abstract Here I reply to the main points raised by the
commentators on the arguments put forward in my
Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (OUP, 2009).
My response is aimed at defending a modest doxastic
account of clinical delusions, and is articulated in three
sections. First, I consider the view that delusions are in-
between perceptual and doxastic states, defended by
Jacob Hohwy and Vivek Rajan, and the view that
delusions are failed attempts at believing or not-quite-
beliefs, proposed by Eric Schwitzgebel and Maura
Tumulty. Then, I address the relationship between the
doxastic account of delusions and the role, nature, and
prospects of folk psychology, which is discussed by
Dominic Murphy, Keith Frankish, and Maura Tumulty
in their contributions. In the final remarks, I turn to the
continuity thesis and suggest that, although there are
important differences between clinical delusions and
non-pathological beliefs, these differences cannot be
characterised satisfactorily in epistemic terms.
Keywords Delusions . Beliefs . Rationality.
Self-Narratives . Folk-Psychology
Introduction
The contributors to this special issue readDelusions and
Other Irrational Beliefs and provided insightful and
constructive criticism of its main theses. Now I am
grateful for the opportunity to revisit and clarify some
of my arguments in the light of their commentaries.
In the book, I argued that there is a tendency
towards idealising beliefs in the philosophy of mind.
The psychological literature invites us, instead, to
consider that beliefs are often badly integrated with
other beliefs, unsupported by evidence, resistant to
change, and behaviourally inefficacious. Once we
accept that everyday beliefs can be irrational in
these ways, it is a short step to maintain that there
is continuity between everyday beliefs and clinical
delusions. Clinical delusions are typically irrational
to a greater extent or irrational across more
dimensions than non-delusional beliefs, but they
are irrational in roughly the same way. Although all
the commentators seem to agree that beliefs should
not be idealised and find the discussion of wide-
spread irrationality in everyday cognition useful,
they remain largely unconvinced by my take on the
status of delusions. For different reasons, they claim
that it is not helpful to think of delusions as beliefs.
Thus, the status of delusions is what I shall focus
on here, making a further attempt at persuading my
critics. I shall defend a modest position. I fully
recognise that the doxastic view of delusions does
not tell us everything we want to know about
delusions, but I maintain that it is at least as good
as the alternative views and, in some respects,
preferable.
In “Delusions: Beliefs or In-between States?”, I shall
comment on two proposals: that delusions are more
like perceptual illusions than they are like beliefs; and
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that delusions are belief states ‘gone half mad’.
According to both proposals, most delusions have
an ‘in-between’ status. They are either in-between
perceptual illusion and doxastic states, or they are
failed attempts at believing. These are carefully
laid out and attractive positions, as they start from
a desire to understand the peculiarities of delu-
sions and aim to account for the apparent gap
between typical beliefs and textbook-cases of
delusions.
In “Delusions and Folk Psychology”, I shall
consider the view that the nature of delusions
cannot be satisfactorily accounted for within the
simplistic descriptive framework of folk psycholo-
gy. One consideration is that we need to recognise
different types of beliefs and identify delusions with
one such type rather than describe them all as
generic beliefs. Another consideration is that scien-
tific psychology and neuroscience are already
showing the limitations of our current folk con-
ceptions of the mind. Thus, to try and fit delusions
within the folk-psychological discourse is an out-dated
project. A third consideration, which would vindicate
the continuing importance of folk psychology, is that by
ascribing beliefs we do not simply describe people’s
behaviour but regulate it. Thus, we cannot stretch folk-
psychological notions to include all delusions, as most
delusions clearly violate the principles which warrant
the ascription of beliefs.
I cannot hope to do full justice to the arguments
I summarise in “Delusions: Beliefs or In-between
States?” and “Delusions and Folk Psychology”, but
I shall argue that the basic notion of belief the
modest doxasticist has in mind is still useful. No
doubt, it is in need of revision in the light of our
scientific understanding of the mind and it is
intrinsically tied to a whole set of normative
notions, but the same can be said for the other
folk-psychological, epistemological or phenomeno-
logical notions used to account for the nature of
delusions, such as perceptual illusions, imaginings,
alternative realities, experiences, and acceptances.
The proposals put forward by the commentators do
not offer an account of the nature of delusions that
is entirely independent of, or necessarily more
explanatory than, standard doxastic accounts. And
to be able to say that, by and large, delusions are
beliefs still has theoretical and pragmatic benefits
over the relevant alternatives.
Finally, in “Concluding Remarks: The Continuity
Thesis”, I shall defend the continuity thesis. Some of
the commentators worry that by identifying delusions
with irrational beliefs I trivialise delusions. But
claiming that delusions are on a continuum with
widespread instances of irrational belief does not
imply that delusions are a trivial phenomenon. A
good theory of the nature of delusions should be
informed both by advances in cognitive neuropsy-
chology and by evidence gathered through clinical
encounters in psychiatry. Whether the available
scientific and clinical evidence supports the doxastic
account of delusions is debatable, as my critics
know all too well, but it powerfully indicates that
there is no radical break between normal and
abnormal cognition.
Delusions: Beliefs or In-between States?
In the traditional literature on the nature of delusions,
the phenomenological and metacognitive accounts are
not particularly appealing as genuine alternatives to
the doxastic account of delusion. Phenomenologists
argue that at the very core of delusions there is no
strange or irrational belief, but a powerful experience
that affects one’s entire conception of reality (e.g.,
[1]). Metacognitivists argue that delusions are acts of
imagination which one misinterprets and attributes to
oneself as beliefs (e.g., [2]). Both positions highlight
important aspects of the phenomenon of clinical
delusions, but they can be seen as complementing
rather than replacing the doxastic account. This is
because neither the phenomenological nor the meta-
cognitive account rules out that the person with
delusions has relevant belief states that interact (more
or less successfully) with her other cognitive and
affective states and with her behaviour. Proponents of
these accounts do not deny that the phenomenon of
delusions involves strange or irrational beliefs, but
they complain against the excessive focus on belief
states, they suggest that delusions are not formed in
the same way as belief states, and, typically, they
emphasise the discontinuity rather than the continuity
between the phenomenon of delusions and that of
irrational beliefs that are more ‘mundane’ in content.
In particular, phenomenologists invite us not to forget
the experiential and emotional aspects of delusional
thought and behaviour, and metacognitivists suggest a
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hypothesis about the formation of delusions that
highlights their similarities with acts of imagination
rather than with beliefs.
In this issue’s commentaries, authors propose novel
hypotheses about the nature of delusions and each of
these proposals deserves a more in-depth examination
than I can offer here. Hohwy and Rajan argue for
there being a strong analogy between delusions and
illusions, and Schwitzgebel and Tumulty, in their
individual contributions, account for delusions as
‘beliefs gone half mad’ or as ‘not quite beliefs’.
Although the proposals differ significantly in content
and motivation, both of them object to the standard
doxastic account, and significantly advance the debate
on the nature of delusions by suggesting that
delusions have an in-between status.
Aren’t Delusions Just Like Perceptual Illusions?
According to Hohwy and Rajan, delusions are
analogous to perceptual illusions and are the result
of faulty perceptual inference. These claims are based
on three arguments: (1) just like illusions, delusions
are unrevisable; (2) just like illusions, delusions can
have varying levels of circumscription; (3) in people
with delusions reasoning competence is intact but
reasoning performance is impaired due to deficient
inputs.
In the book and elsewhere I have dealt very
minimally with theories of delusion formation, for
practical and theoretical reasons. First, advances in
the field of cognitive neuropsychology are rapid, and
the status of even the most influential theories of
delusion formation on the market is fluid. This makes
it really hard to adjudicate between competing
hypotheses. Second, it is debatable whether the fine
details of the process of delusion formation can
determine what the status of delusions is. If we can
clearly distinguish the mechanisms responsible for the
formation of different types of mental states, and
discover that delusions are formed in the same way as
a particular type of mental state, then we have
evidence that delusions can be legitimately considered
mental states of that type. But this cannot be the
whole story: for each type of mental state several
causal paths are possible, and the effects of the mental
state on other mental states and on behaviour are at
least as important in the identification of the type of
mental state in question as the causal path. Cannot
something start out as an imagining and then become
a belief, or viceversa? That is why in the book I
focus on the role that delusions play in the mental
economy of the people reporting them and on
whether the surface (epistemic) features of delu-
sions are shared by typical cases of belief. Here
again, I shall not discuss those arguments in favour
of the analogy between delusions and perceptual
illusions that are based on aetiological consider-
ations. Rather, I shall ask whether the features that
Hohwy and Rajan attribute to both delusions and
perceptual illusions are shared by beliefs too. I am
not looking for a victory of the doxastic account
over the competing perceptual account—I shall
settle for a tie.
Let’s start with the argument that delusions (just
like perceptual illusions) are not revisable.
Many illusions are unrevisable. No matter how
many times one measures the Müller-Lyer lines
with a ruler, one cannot revise the perceptual
inference that they are of unequal lengths. This
is similar to delusions against which normal
reality testing is powerless. If the unrevisability
of illusions is due to some kind of cognitive
impenetrability specific to low level sensory
processes, then the same may be the case for
delusional content [3].
The unrevisability of delusions is considered one
of their most distinctive features. Delusions are
typically resistant to counterevidence, more so than
ordinary beliefs, but it is probably an exaggeration to
say that “normal reality testing is powerless against
delusions”. Three sources of information recommend
caution: the consideration of clinical case studies; the
evidence on the effectiveness of cognitive probing
(often in the context of cognitive behavioural therapy)
in the treatment of delusions; and the reports of
people who successfully manage their delusions. We
know of some cases reported in the psychological
literature (e.g., [4]) in which certain forms of
cognitive probing bring some delusions to an end,
although the process is often a slow and gradual one.
Even when the delusion is not entirely abandoned, the
conviction in the content of the delusion can be
undermined by challenging the coherence of main-
taining the delusion with endorsing other attitudes
that fail to support the delusion. The emerging,
though still not conclusive, evidence on the success
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of cognitive behavioural therapy in the treatment of
delusions when combined with effective medication
(e.g., [5]) raises some further doubts about unrevis-
ability as such. This form of therapy often involves
encouraging people to adopt a more critical attitude
towards the content of their delusions, and consider
alternative explanations for their baffling experiences.
Moreover, in the first-person accounts of delusions
published in the Schizophrenia Bulletin, it is striking
how people seem to recur to the techniques of critical
thinking to distance themselves from their delusional
experiences (e.g., [6]), as if they had somehow
‘internalised’ the challenges they had been subject to
in their encounters with clinical psychiatrists or had
developed original way of coping which consists in
doubting the content of their delusional states on the
basis of considerations of plausibility and coherence.
I began to figure out a way to undo my
delusions. I reasoned that if some of my
thoughts were disturbed, I could use my
unaffected mind to think myself well again. A
delusion is a false belief one believes strongly
and does not question. Yet one does not want to
be misled by or base one’s life on false beliefs.
Therefore, it is important to be open to
exploring the possibility that each paranoid
belief may be a delusion. […] I began
designing a “four-step system” to question,
recognize, counterargue, and replace delusions.
([6], page 549)
Naturally, there are extremely stubborn delusions
which are a counterexample to this type of evidence.
But overall, in the case of delusions, revision is
unlikely and arduous rather than impossible. This does
not undermine Hohwy and Rajan’s claim about
delusions being to some extent cognitively impene-
trable. We still need to explain why delusions are
harder to revise than the typical belief, and the
resistance to counterevidence observed in delusions
does support the analogy between delusions and
perceptual illusions.
Let’s move on to the idea that delusions be more or
less circumscribed.
Once we realise an illusion is in fact just an
illusion it is possible to circumscribe it to some
degree such that it does not infect other internal
models. For example, we do not revise our overall
models of the capabilities of animate and inani-
mate matter when we experience the ventriloquist
illusion… Some delusions also have a degree of
circumscription, such as the case of mirrored self-
misidentification where the patient merely avoids
mirrors rather than is utterly freaked by the
presence of a strange lookalike in the mirror [3].
Other illusions are not circumscribed… Similarly,
some delusional perceptual inference infects the
wider belief system and agency … There will
probably be different causes for such differing
degrees of integration, but it many delusions seem
to begin with sensory malfunction in sensory
domains for which it is difficult to apply concrete
reality testing methods [3].
Hohwy and Rajan observe how some delusions
remain circumscribed and some “infect” the whole
belief system. This is a very interesting phenome-
non that cannot be easily mapped onto specific
types of delusions: it is not the case (as one might
expect) that monothematic delusions are always
circumscribed, and polythematic ones are always
elaborated. Delusions of misidentification (such as
Capgras) can be very circumscribed. For instance, a
man who believes that his wife has been replaced
by an impostor can be friendly and even flirty with
the alleged impostor and do nothing to retrieve the
‘original’ wife. But other instances of the same type
of delusions can show high levels of good
integration between one’s delusion and one’s other
attitudes and behaviour. For instance, some people
with Capgras delusion can be hostile, even violent
and aggressive, towards the alleged impostor. The
same inconsistency can be observed in delusions of
mirrored self misidentification (which is the exam-
ple used by Hohwy and Rajan). In some cases, it is
obvious that one covertly recognises the stranger in
the mirror as oneself—the stranger is even named
after oneself. In other cases, one experiences first
surprise and then intense distress at the thought of a
stranger in the house [7].
In order to assess the analogy between illusions
and delusions with respect to circumscription, some
more information would be useful. For instance, is it
common for very similar illusory experiences to be
circumscribed in some subjects and not in others? On
what does circumscription depend in the case of
perceptual illusions? Depending on the answers to
these questions, then the phenomenon of circumscrip-
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tion could further support an analogy between
illusions and delusions.
Finally, let’s consider the claim that in people with
delusions reasoning competence is intact but reason-
ing performance is impaired (just like in people with
perceptual illusions). Hohwy and Rajan believe that
identifying the cause of delusion with a failure in
reasoning competence is important to my project of
arguing for the doxastic account of delusions.
It is easier to defend the position that delusions
are of a kind with other irrational beliefs if they
are generated by a reasoning competence failure
than if they, in contrast to other irrational beliefs,
are generated by deficient sensory processing
plus intact reasoning competence. The choice of
alliances in this debate is thus relevant for how
we evaluate the conclusions of DOIB [3].
Should we commit to the idea that for any
irrational belief we need to postulate a failure in
reasoning competence rather than a failure in reason-
ing performance? Unless we do, then the hypothesis
that delusions are generated by “deficient sensory
processing plus intact reasoning competence” is
perfectly compatible with the doxastic account of
delusions. Hohwy and Rajan’s hypothesis does
undermine some aetiological accounts of delusions
which consider a reasoning competence failure as a
necessary condition for delusion formation. But it
does not (per se) undermine the claim that delusions
are belief states. Hohwy and Rajan’s real target seems
to be the two-factor theory of delusion formation, not
the doxastic view of delusions in general.
The two-factor theory is problematic for a variety
of reasons. It posits a domain general deficit of
reasoning competence so it predicts that patients
should have widespread delusions and yet patients
with monothematic delusions do not. It also
predicts that delusions are constantly present,
instead of being, as seems to be the case, more
dynamically shifting states [3].
I have some sympathy for the two-factor theory, as
the authors realise, but, as it stands, it does have some
limitations in explanatory power, and it is not the only
approach to delusion formation that is compatible
with the doxastic account. Even if we were to buy all
the arguments against the two-factor theory, we would
not have an argument against the doxastic account. As
it happens, both charges against the two-factor theory
in the passage above are a bit quick. First, the fact that
there is a reasoning deficit may make it difficult to
explain why some delusions start out as confined to
one specific theme, but makes it easier to explain why
these delusions often tend to spread. People who
initially believe that their spouse has been replaced by
an impostor may end up thinking that their entire
family, or village, is made of replicas. Other delusions
are subject to similar “spreading” over time. Second,
the fluctuation of conviction in the delusional content
is something that the nature of the delusional
experience can help explain, and can also be
accounted for by reference to the affective, motiva-
tional and contextual factors which are responsible for
the fluctuation of conviction in the content of
everyday beliefs (see [8]).
In sum, what is Hohwy and Rajan’s take on the
status of delusions?
[I]t is not a given that they are irrational beliefs,
on a par with other irrational beliefs. Some
delusions could very well be better understood
as irrational perceptual inferences [3].
The proposal is that delusions are not of a kind
with other irrational beliefs, because they are not
caused by a reasoning competence failure. But this is
based on the assumption that all irrational beliefs
derive from a failure of reasoning competence, and no
good reason has been offered to believe that this is the
case. Notice that the doxastic account is not challenged
by the description of delusions the authors favour. When
it comes to resistance to counterevidence, belief
persistence is an incredibly common phenomenon, and
not just among motivated beliefs. This suggests that we
should not talk about resistance to counterevidence as a
distinctive feature of all delusions. Rather, we should
say that typically delusions resist counterevidence to a
greater extent than ordinary beliefs. When I dismiss
evidence against a theory of mine, but I do not so
easily dismiss evidence against the rival theory, I am
being irrational in much the same way as a person with
a stubborn delusion. She will explain away apparently
conflicting evidence and find (sometimes implausible)
reasons to uphold the delusion, but the possibility of
revision, or at least of reducing her conviction in the
delusion, is not completely ruled out. A similar point
can be made about circumscription. Beliefs also have
varying levels of circumscription, as the much
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discussed problem of the compartmentalisation of the
mind in epistemology shows (e.g., [9, 10]), and in this
respect they do not significantly differ from delusions
or perceptual illusions.
Hohwy and Rajan’s positive conclusion is that
delusions are the result of perceptual inference, but in
a framework where the difference between perceptual
and doxastic states is downplayed. For this reason, I
do not see the aetiological account of delusions
defended by Hohwy and Rajan as a challenge to the
doxastic account.
The difference between belief and perception
lies in the time scale of the represented
processes and their degree of invariance or
perspective independence. There is no further
special difference between them and the issue of
rationality applies equally to perception and
belief. From this perspective it is therefore easy
to see how perception can be irrational [3].
On the whole, Hohwy and Rajan’s well-argued
position on the causes and nature of delusions is not
damning for the doxastic account. Although the
analogy between delusions and perceptual illusions
is convincing and enlightening, it does not put too
much pressure on the view that delusions are belief
states. On the basis of surface features, the analogy
between delusions and ordinary beliefs is at least as
convincing as the analogy between delusions and
perceptual illusions. Aetiological considerations could
motivate the difference between having the status of
beliefs or having the status of the perceptual illusions,
but Hohwy and Rajan themselves recognise that the
gap between beliefs and illusions in their account is
narrow: both can be the result of perceptual inference,
and both can be irrational.
Aren’t Delusions ‘Beliefs Gone Half Mad’?
Schwitzgebel and Tumulty notice a potential tension
in the doxastic account of delusions. On the one hand,
I defend the view that delusions are beliefs, and the
title of the book also implies that delusions are
irrational beliefs. On the other hand, I concede that
some delusional phenomena do not necessarily
involve belief states—here commentators refer to the
discussion of disowned thoughts, whose content is not
endorsed by the subjects reporting those thoughts (see
also [11, 12]).
Through virtually the whole book, Bortolotti
presents herself as defending the view that
delusions are beliefs against the view that they
are not beliefs, without—it seems to me—much
recognition of the possibility that at least some of
themmight be vague, in-betweenish cases, in some
respects belief-like and in other respects not-very-
belief-like. However, near the end of the book,
Bortolotti comes close to endorsing the in-between
approach [13].
When she discusses the activity of offering
(what seem to the subject to be) good current
reasons for belief, Bortolotti explicitly allows
that someone doing that badly enough won’t
count as doing it at all, and hence couldn’t
usefully be ascribed the relevant belief [14].
According to Schwitzgebel, there is a solution to
this apparent tension, a solution that in his view I
have briefly considered but underestimated in the
book. The solution is to think that being a belief is a
property that comes in degrees: this is a version of the
“sliding scale”, an approach to belief ascription
endorsed by Cherniak in his work on minimal
rationality [15] and described by Stich [16, 17] as an
alternative to the rigidity of some interpretations of
the intentional stance [18]. According to Tumulty, I
should have acknowledged that when delusions fail to
satisfy folk-psychological norms, describing them as
beliefs is just a convenient shorthand.
I quickly set aside the sliding scale in chapter one
of the book. Let me revisit the proposal now, in the
light of Schwitzgebel’s suggestion that my doxastic
account of delusions might have more in common
with it than I was happy to concede. When we ask
whether non-human animals have beliefs, or whether
a delusion is a belief, we might think that a ‘yes-or-no’
answer is unsatisfactory. The sliding scale offers a
sensible approach: the mental state is question can be
considered as more or less of a belief depending on the
extent to which its features overlap with features of
typical belief states. In this way, it is possible to
emphasise the similarities between beliefs and ‘proto-
beliefs’ (as sometimes the mental representations of
non-human animals are called), or between beliefs
and delusions, without neglecting their important
differences. Thanks to the sliding scale, both
similarities and differences are reflected in the
status of these mental states, an in-between status.
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There is no doubt that the sliding scale is an
attractive option, especially when we compare it to
other accounts of belief ascription. But I have some
reservations about it. One is about the basic assump-
tions underlying the account. The sliding scale does
not imply a rejection of the rationality constraint on
belief ascription. The “typical features” that a state
needs to exhibit to count as a belief tend to coincide
with what interpretationists consider standards of
rationality for beliefs. The idea that there is a
necessary connection between being rational and
being ascribed beliefs is still at the foundation of the
sliding scale. But instead of there being a threshold of
rationality that all mental states need to satisfy in
order to qualify as beliefs, the sliding scale proposes
that being a belief is a matter of degree. Thus, we
could say that a representational state guiding the
behaviour of a dog with a limited conceptual
apparatus, or a delusion reported by a person with
Capgras syndrome which is circumscribed and rarely
acted upon, are only partially beliefs; they are beliefs
in so far as they satisfy the norms of rationality that
we expect beliefs to satisfy (e.g., the respect of some
inferential connections, action guidance in the relevant
circumstances, etc.).
As one of the main objectives in the book is to
challenge the existence of a necessary link between
rationality and belief ascription, the assumption
behind the sliding scale was not something I was
prepared to accept: no interesting notion of rationality
can be seen as the mark of the intentionality of belief
states (this also explains why I do not end up
claiming, with Tumulty, that when rational and other
norms are violated, belief ascription is just a conve-
nient shorthand. More about this in “Delusions and
Folk Psychology”). With respect to the intentional
stance, the sliding scale is a more psychologically
plausible and flexible approach to belief ascription,
but it does not explicitly resist the view that
rationality is what determines whether something is
a belief. Although there may be reasons to think that
some mental states are genuinely in-between, and are
not full beliefs, these reasons should not be dictated
by whether the mental states in question satisfy norms
of rationality.
In the book I suggest that whether the subject
manifests some endorsement of the content of a
certain mental state is an important criterion to
establish whether the mental state is a belief. Thus, I
am happy to concede that some delusional phenomena
are not belief states (e.g., inserted thoughts that are not
endorsed at all or delusional moods) or that they are
borderline cases (e.g., badly endorsed delusions).
However, most delusions, typical delusions, are suffi-
ciently endorsed to be beliefs, even if they do not satisfy
the standards for rational beliefs. The key point is that it
is not rationality per se which dictates which mental
states are beliefs. The main reason for believing that
rationality does not play this central role is that, if we
conclude that delusions are not beliefs because of their
irrationality, then we need to conclude the same about
what we take to be typical cases of belief which also
fail to satisfy norms of rationality (this is what I call in
the book the ‘double-standards objection’).
Schwitzgebel suggests another approach to the
sliding scale option that does not depend on mental
states meeting standards of rationality—his view is
that belief states need to have belief-like effects.
Beliefs can arise in any old weird way, but—if
they are to be beliefs—they cannot have just
any old effects. They must have, broadly
speaking, belief-like effects; the person in that
state must be disposed to act and react, to
behave, to feel, and to cognize in the way
characteristic of a normal believer-that-P [13]
Since match to a functional profile is a matter of
degree, it seems natural to suppose that possession
of belief will also, at least sometimes, be a matter
of degree [13]
This approach is one that I find very plausible. It
partially overlaps with the criterion I propose in the
book: one’s endorsement of the content of a mental
states is central to whether one’s state is a belief. Such
endorsement is usually transparent in behavioural
manifestations: in reporting the belief with conviction,
in providing reasons in support of the content of the
belief, and in acting on the belief in the relevant
circumstances. But let me briefly consider some
objections against even an enlightened sliding scale
approach. The sliding scale might deliver good results
in terms of allowing us to discriminate between
mental states with more or less belief-like features,
but it becomes impractical if we think that a lot hangs
on whether an individual is ascribed beliefs.
Suppose we think that only individuals with beliefs
and desires (and other similarly complex intentional
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states) are entitled to a certain form of moral
consideration (e.g., because their possession of inten-
tional states indicates that they also have morally
relevant interests). Then, the ascription of partial beliefs
does not help. Debates about whether non-human
animals have beliefs have important repercussions on
issues concerning moral status, and debates about
whether people with delusions genuinely believe what
they say informs claims about their capacity for
autonomy and responsibility, about appropriateness of
treatment, and about potential suspension of rights.
There are many ways to address this issue which
would need to be assessed in much more detail than I can
do here. We may decide that there is no tight connection
between intentional-state ascription and debates about
moral consideration and autonomy. Alternatively, we
may decide that questions about moral consideration and
autonomy should also be answered by appealing to
degrees: a person with partial beliefs may be only
partially autonomous with respect to the decisions and
actions motivated by those mental states. All I suggest is
that the perceived connection between being ascribed
beliefs and being given moral consideration, or being
attributed autonomy and moral responsibility, which is
made in legal and policy frameworks and in lay
conceptions, deserves to be taken into account. If, after
philosophical inquiry, we discover that such a connec-
tion is justified, then a framework where partial beliefs
are ascribed is less practical than a framework
according to which there is a minimal requirement
for the ascription of beliefs, and ‘belief ’ is an on-
off notion rather than a graded one. In other words,
if we have a minimal notion of belief, and a
minimal notion of autonomy and moral consider-
ation to go with it, this might make certain debates
more straight-forward at least on paper, although of
course it would still be very difficult to judge
whether a certain individual engaging in a certain
form of behaviour meets the minimal standards that
apply to ‘believers’.
The other worry is how to flesh out the sliding scale
account. The original sliding scale proposes that mental
states are either full or partial beliefs depending on how
well they meet the standards of rationality that apply to
beliefs. In Schwitzgebel’s version, the claim is that
delusions have only some of the effects that beliefs
usually have, and thus they are neither entirely
successful beliefs nor other than beliefs but something
in between. Schwitzgebel also talks about some
predicates being vague and needing contextual infor-
mation, and draws an analogy between predicates such
as “believing that p” (where the person reporting that p
does not manifest the right dispositions) and “being
tall”. Tumulty seems to offer us a choice: mental states
that are not quite beliefs can be described as other
types of intentional states (e.g., imaginings) or as more-
or-less close approximations to beliefs.
In in-between cases of canonically vague predi-
cates like “tall”, the appropriateness of ascribing
the predicate varies contextually, and often the best
approach is to refuse to either simply ascribe or
simply deny the predicate but rather to specify
more detail (e.g., “well, he’s five foot eleven
inches”); so too, I would argue, in in-between
cases of belief. [13]
What about cases in which the subject’s state plays
some but not all of the relevant functional role, has
some but not all of the appropriate belief-ish causes
and effects? Delusions would appear to be just
such a case [13].
Is it possible, then, that cases of delusion are, at
least sometimes (when the functional role or
dispositional profile is weird enough), cases in
an in-betweenish gray zone—not quite belief
and not quite failure to believe? [13]
When a subject fails to fit the dispositional profile
for believing that p, we have a choice. We can
decide it is best to view her as mostly fitting a
different profile (e.g. for imagining that p, or for
believing that not-p). Alternatively, we can decide
that it is best to view her as fitting poorly the
profile for believing that p. In the latter case, we
are not pressed to find any non-doxastic account
of her state. We can simply say that she’s not-
quite-believing that p, or believing-badly that p
[14].
What delusions are is not spelt out in any more
detail. But Schwitzgebel’s position on in-between
believing in general is cashed out in his 2001 paper
[19], where examples of apparent beliefs that do not
give rise to the expected dispositions are described
and discussed. If I assert with sincerity and conviction
that nurses are poisoning me whilst eating the food
they hand me, my delusion is a non-entirely success-
ful attempt at believing that nurses are poisoning me
and qualifies for the in-between status.
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There seem to be different versions of the sliding
scale on the market. Here are two interpretations of
the sliding scale as applied to delusions. One is that
delusions are belief states with indeterminate content.
If b does not meet the standards of rationality for
beliefs, or does not have the right functional profile,
then b is a belief but its content cannot be determined
with precision and thus it cannot be used in explain-
ing and predicting the behaviour of the person
reporting the belief. Back to the example above, it is
indeterminate whether I believe that nurses are
poisoning me.
The alternative position is that delusions are hybrid
states. If b does not meet the standards of rationality
for beliefs, or does not have the right functional
profile, then b is partially a belief and partially
something else. This is compatible with b having
determinate content: I may be half-believing and half-
imagining that nurses are poisoning me. In the context
of delusions, it has been suggested that delusions are in-
between beliefs and imaginings, or between beliefs and
desires (see [20] and the recent debate featuring Reimer,
Bayne, and Graham in the December 2010 issue of
Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology [21–23]).
In his commentary, Murphy (this issue) raises a
point that is at the basis of hybrid accounts, that
beliefs are not the only intentional states that can
explain and drive behaviour, and so delusions can be
described equally well as beliefs and as imaginings.
He does not argue for a hybrid account, but concludes
that defenders and critics of the doxastic account of
delusions reach a stand-off.
[A] state of mind can indeed fail the tests of
rationality while explaining behavior, but such
states are not beliefs. Imaginings, (Currie 2000)
are one such state: I can behave in a way that
makes it look like I believe that aliens are after
me even if I am only imaging, not believing,
that aliens are after me. On this view there are
lots of intentional states that can drive behavior,
even in ways that make sense of the behavior as
an expression of the state of mind [24].
Imaginings can cause action, but the circumstances
in which they do are typically different from those in
which beliefs cause action. Moreover, beliefs tend to
cause different types of action. If I imagine that there
are aliens chasing after me, I can experience the
relevant emotions—feel fear and adrenaline mixed
together—and react to this imagined situation in a
similar way to the way in which I enter the fictional
reality of a well-made action movie and empathise
with the struggles of the lead actor. This form of
behaviour will affect my real life (I can instinctively
recoil from an image that reminds me of the imagined
threat), but will not last much longer than the time of
the pretence (or the movie) and at some point clash
with some awareness of the unreality of the scenario.
If I genuinely believe that there are aliens after me,
the consequences for my behaviour will be typically
deeper, longer-lasting and further-reaching. People
who suffer from delusions of persecution are obviously
distressed by the perceived threat to the point of
transforming their lives, often in a costly and disruptive
way. They can move home a number of times to escape
neighbouring spies, change city and job to avoid
meeting hostile aliens, or cut off contact with family
and friends to spare them the intrusive and ill-meaning
interference of government agencies [25]. This form of
behaviour—which is motivated by the content of their
delusions and is accompanied by a series of less radical
but equally significant safety behaviours [26]—is not
the behaviour of someone who is in the grip of her
imagination, is absorbed in a movie, or daydreams. It is
the behaviour of someone who believes that something
genuinely dangerous is out there, threatening her. In
most cases, people with delusions behave as people
who believe the content of their delusions: they assert
delusions with conviction, they defend them with
tentative arguments, they act on them and they infer
other beliefs from their delusional states.
The rejoinder is familiar by now from the
discussion of Hohwy and Rajan’s and Schwitzgebel’s
and Tumulty’s views. What about those delusions that
are not so consistently held, come and go, or fail to
motivate any relevant form of behaviour? When I say
that nurses are poisoning me but eat their food
nonetheless, am I not fitting the profile of the person
who is imagining a threatening situation rather than
that of a person who is genuinely worried about the
hospital food? Here I think the ‘stand-off ’ Murphy
talks about can be avoided if we recognise that
delusions are generally behaviourally effective, but
can fail to guide action due to phenomena that are
anything but rare in the psychiatric disorders that
manifest with delusions, such as schizophrenia,
dementia, and delusional disorders. These may
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include meta-representational deficits, conflicting atti-
tudes, co-morbidity with depression, and fluctuations
in motivation caused by changes in affect (e.g.,
poverty of action, avolition, flat affect, emotional
disturbances). Action that would follow some
delusions with bizarre content can also be inhibited
by features of the physical and social environment
surrounding the agent (see [8] for more details).
With the worry about a possible stand-off in the
background, can I confidently claim that the standard
doxastic account is preferable to the sliding scale
approach? My impression is that the sliding scale
approach is to be preferred to a doxastic account
according to which (1) delusions are beliefs, and (2)
the notion of belief appealed to is strictly regimented
by either norms of rationality for beliefs or by the
dictates of the typical functional profile of belief
states. Such a doxastic account would fail to
characterise delusions (and most everyday beliefs)
correctly. But if the notion of belief advocated is a
basic one, which permits some failures of rationality
and some departure from the textbook functional
profile of well-behaved beliefs, then I see no obvious
advantages in adopting the sliding scale.
The modest doxasticist can describe as beliefs both
the representational states guiding Fido in chasing the
squirrel up the oak tree, and the delusional states of
the hospital patient who suspects that nurses are
poisoning her, but eats their food nonetheless. The
modest doxasticist does not need to be a revolutionary
either—she fleshes out the folk-psychological notion
of a subject’s beliefs as states that entertain meaning-
ful relationships with the subject’s other intentional
states, are sensitive to evidence, can lead to action in
some of the relevant circumstances, and can be
supported with reasons if they are the type of beliefs
that can be the object of justification and deliberation.
Although some other intentional states share some of the
features above, I still think that the combination of those
features is sufficient to demarcate belief-like states from
other intentional states and avoid the stand-off.
Delusions and Folk Psychology
In the commentaries by Murphy, Frankish and
Tumulty the idea that delusions are beliefs is
challenged on the basis of considerations about the
role, nature, and future prospects of folk psychology.
Murphy argues that delusions are diagnosed pre-
cisely when folk psychology fails to account for
people’s behaviour. Thus, treating delusions as beliefs
can make us lose sight of what is distinctive about
them. In order to press this point, he compares
delusions with self-deceptions and culturally-relative
beliefs. Self-deception does make sense within folk
psychology as we can understand how people are
motivated to believe something that is likely to be
false. Beliefs are that strange from our own
perspective, but are embedded in a form of life or
a cultural framework can also be explained. But
delusions are more puzzling.
Frankish suggests that the simplistic notion of
belief used by interpretationists and by myself needs
to be better qualified given the often hidden com-
plexities of folk psychology and the recent advances
in the scientific study of belief states. The proposed
qualification takes the form of a distinction between
types of beliefs. Frankish talks about level 1 and level
2 beliefs, and maintains that such a distinction is
implicit in our folk-psychological practices. In his
account, when delusions are doxastic states, they are
like acceptances or policies (level 2 beliefs) which are
consciously formed and reported, but not always
manifested in behaviour.
Tumulty stresses the regulative function of folk
psychology. In a very rich and stimulating commen-
tary, she puts forward a view of folk psychology as a
way of exercising control over ourselves and others.
In her picture, norms dictated by rationality and the
functional profile of well-behaved beliefs are essential
to the success of belief ascription, not because people
need to obey such norms in order for beliefs to be
ascribed to them, but because ascribing beliefs to
them disposes them to obey the norms. Thus, for
Tumulty, it is a mistake to divorce belief ascription
from rationality.
Aren’t There Different Types of Beliefs?
In the book I argue that there are different types of
beliefs, and I characterise what is in common
among them in very broad terms. I notice how
ideological and religious beliefs can have a more
relaxed relationship with some forms of empirical
evidence than scientific beliefs, and how opinions
are more likely to be defended with reasons than
perceptual beliefs.
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That said, I do not commit to a particular metaphys-
ical view of what beliefs are. I compare the notion of
belief to a fictional character in a fairy tale, like
Cinderella. There may not be any girl who was
mistreated by her step-sisters and who, after joining
the royal ball, lost one of her shoes, and ended up
marrying a prince. But there are girls out there who are
subject to abuse in their families and find freedom, love,
and happiness later in life. Similarly, beliefs as we intend
them may not exist out of the fiction of folk-
psychological discourse. But there must be some
respectable psychological kind whose features approx-
imate those of beliefs and can help explain some of the
phenomena that we now explain by appealing to beliefs
and to their relationship with other intentional states,
with evidence and with action.
In their insightful commentaries, Murphy and
Frankish ask legitimate questions. Is it worth spend-
ing time on the folk-psychological notion of belief,
which is unlikely to denote a natural kind and is likely
to be replaced in a mature science of the mind? Isn’t a
general notion of belief, one-size-fits-all, also unlikely
to make good sense of our folk-psychological
practices? Couldn’t we distinguish between types of
beliefs with different features and then ask whether
delusions are beliefs of a particular type?
Perhaps the very diverse causes of belief that
folk thought recognizes is evidence that belief is
not a natural kind, and that a mature psychology
should recognize a number of different sorts of
intentional state with different relations to each
other and to behavior. Perhaps we need to
distinguish deliberative states that do meet the
rationality constraints as a special kind of
intentional state [24].
I want to introduce a basic distinction between
two types of belief, which is latent in folk
psychology. On the one hand, we ascribe beliefs to
a wide variety of creatures and artefacts on the
basis of their unreflective, nonverbal behaviour
and without assuming that the attitudes we ascribe
can be introspected, are under personal control, or
are functionally discrete. On the other hand, we
also use the term ‘belief’ in a more restricted way,
for a state that is available to consciousness, is
controlled, and can be selectively employed in
reasoning and decision making [27].
It is difficult to resist the appeal of these sugges-
tions, as any philosopher of mind is aware that the
differences that can be found among the very
heterogeneous mental states we call ‘beliefs’ are the
main reason why a list of necessary and sufficient
conditions for beliefs is so elusive. Beliefs differ in
formation process, content, duration, accessibility,
susceptibility to justification and revision, integration
with other intentional states, manifestability, and so
on. What I am still not sure about is whether it is
worth clustering these undeniable differences into
types or levels of beliefs.
For instance, Frankish claims that it is a fact that
behavioural dispositions are not open to introspection,
are not explicitly deliberated about, and are graded,
whereas acceptances are conscious, controlled, and
binary. Murphy proposes that we distinguish the
rational outputs of deliberation from other forms of
beliefs which are much more vulnerable to irrational-
ity. Both suggestions are plausible, but my concern is
that they will not solve the problem of having mental
states that deviate from the standard (whether this is
presented as a functional profile, as a set of norms of
rationality, or as necessary and sufficient conditions for a
type of belief). The problem is that the proposed
clusterings are to some extent arbitrary. Some behavioural
dispositions are open to introspection, and some accept-
ances may not be explicitly deliberated about. Frankish
also talks about how policies and acceptances can give
rise in time to level 1 beliefs, rendering the picture
extremely fluid. Similarly, pace Murphy, irrationality
does not spare the outputs of deliberation, whereas some
behavioural dispositions we have not consciously
adopted or reflected about can be perfectly in line with
other beliefs, well-supported by evidence, and consis-
tently manifested in behaviour. If this level of flexibility
between levels or types of beliefs is acknowledged in
the discussion, then we lose the motivation to codify
beliefs into types. We can say that many delusions are
more like acceptances than they are like behavioural
dispositions, but we have not gained much in explan-
atory power. We have refined our conceptual resources
and noticed how some features of beliefs often go
together, and this may help us provide better descriptive
account of delusions. I do not see how the new
description can undermine or support the doxastic
account of delusion.
It is another matter if we take these prima facie
differences among beliefs to justify a more radical
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conclusion (which I take is Murphy’s aim), that belief
is not a natural kind and is just a placeholder, to be
soon replaced by not one but a set of more
scientifically respectable notions. In this case, the
initial observation that there are differences among
types of beliefs leads to scepticism about the folk-
psychological framework as a whole. There are
certainly good reasons for this scepticism—but I
want to throw in the debate two questions. One is
whether delusions give us a special reason to
challenge the unitary nature of belief states. Clearly,
there are differences among ordinary beliefs which
equally need explaining. Delusions are in good
company when they stretch the domain of applica-
tion of the concept ‘belief ’, and some of the
examples provided by Murphy (motivated and
ideological beliefs) are as different from the ideal
or standard belief (e.g., the rational one or the one
with the right functional profile) as delusions are.
(More about this in “Concluding Remarks: The
Continuity Thesis”).
The other question is what we ought to do while we
wait for scientific psychology and neuroscience to
hand us a new mental vocabulary. As I suggested
earlier, folk-psychological notions such as beliefs,
desires, and intentions pervade our understanding of
minded beings and are central to the systematization of
our moral intuitions. It is essential to flag inconsisten-
cies in these notions and challenge some of their uses,
but it would be difficult to do without them altogether
at this stage. Murphy says: “Bortolotti’s arguments […]
may not serve as a foundation for a developed science
of abnormal intentional states” [24]. True. But what
shall we say about delusions, self-deception, etc.
while the science of abnormal intentional states
reaches maturity? And how are we going to develop
such a science if not by gradually revising our
existing conceptual framework?
In the book I was attempting to offer reasons to
divorce the intentionality of belief states from
rationality, and to provide a minimal account of belief
that could capture a general phenomenon without
obscuring the obvious differences between types of
belief. This is one way (a moderately revisionist
way) to look forward. Surely there are more
revolutionary approaches, and it is possible that
these can offer a better foundation for the science
of abnormal intentional states. But to my knowl-
edge they cannot yet solve the puzzle of delusions
or even explain what delusions are to a better effect
than modest doxasticism.
What if Folk Psychology is Regulative?
Tumulty is the most sympathetic of all the commen-
tators to one of the main objectives in the book, as she
seems genuinely convinced that there is continuity
between so-called irrational beliefs and delusions. But
she is also the least sympathetic to the other main
objective, that is, the attempt to distinguish the criteria
for ascribing beliefs from the criteria for rationality.
The difference between Tumulty’s position and
mine is that while I generously hand the status of
beliefs to both delusions and more mundane
instances of irrational thought, she is tempted to
deny it to both. We can conveniently talk about
beliefs, Tumulty says, but for something to be a
belief certain norms need to be satisfied: “when a
subject violates a norm that shapes an important part
of the dispositional profile for a belief, she fails fully
to have the belief in question” [14].
Why are norms so central to our folk-psychological
practices? According to Tumulty, belief ascription
has a regulative (as opposed to merely descriptive)
function: we mould people’s behaviour by ascribing
beliefs to them.
[M]any subjects presenting with delusions don’t
seem to be exercising much virtual control of
the kind that would make a belief-ascription
appropriate. In talking about subjects like that,
then, our ascriptions of belief may be merely
convenient short-hand. The ascriptions signal
that these subjects possess a certain cluster of
dispositions, relevant in this conversational
context, but don’t commit us further on the
questions of how belief-like their behavior
will be in general, or in the future, or in
dramatically different contexts [14].
According to Tumulty, without reference to the
norms that govern the ascription of beliefs it would be
difficult to tell beliefs apart from other intentional
states, and to characterise adequately the difference
between them. Preserving the link between rationality
(and other norms) and belief ascription is a way to
differentiate beliefs from other intentional states that
share some of their features. It is an important project
to be able to tell apart beliefs from other intentional
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states, but I think it can and should be done without
appealing to norms of rationality (as I argued in
“Aren’t Delusions ‘Beliefs Gone Half Mad’?”). Even
irrational or badly behaved beliefs play a significantly
different role in people’s mental economies from that
of imaginings and desires—the key issue seems to be
the capacity that a subject has to endorse the content
of the report she makes or the thought she entertains.
Where the capacity is radically compromised, then the
bases for ascribing beliefs is undermined.
One way in which I attempt to develop this idea in
the book is by reference to the construction of self-
narratives. Beliefs that are endorsed tend to be woven
into stories that not only serve to impose coherence
on past experiences, but also shape future behaviour
and give direction to one’s life, creating a dynamic
concept of oneself as an agent. Not surprisingly,
Tumulty appreciates the reference to self-narratives in
this context, as it goes hand in hand with some
recognition of the regulative function of folk psychology.
As narrators, we exercise control over our own mental
states. We select which ones are important enough to be
integrated in the story and slowly build a picture of
ourselves as actors that we are happy with. This process
of self-creation (see also [28]) mirrors the ‘moulding’
that we are often responsible for when we are
interpreters of others. If people report something with
conviction, we expect them to defend their claim with
reasons and to act in a way that does not conflict with
their report. Such expectations have the potential to
affect the way in which other people behave. When we
construct a self-narrative, we turn the same form of
regulative attention onto ourselves.
Tumulty and I are in perfect agreement on this way of
presenting the issue, but we seem to differ with respect
to the question whether people with delusions can count
as ‘believers’ and whether they can integrate delusions
in their self-narratives. I would say they can, and
Tumulty would say they cannot. In most circumstances,
people with delusions do not lose their capacity for
constructing a self-narrative, and they seem to be able to
include many aspects of their delusional experiences
and thought into a picture of themselves that guides their
future actions [29]. It is precisely the capacity for
constructing a delusional narrative, that is, a narrative
in which the delusion is well-integrated and often
plays a dominant role, which makes it sometimes
really hard to get rid of the delusion. When a
delusion is doubted and challenged, a whole
narrative identity comes close to collapse, generat-
ing understandable anxiety and depression.
The narratives constructed by people with delu-
sions are not necessarily good narratives, where
‘goodness’ here depends on the extent to which they
correspond to real life events and on their internal
coherence. Gerrans [30] describes people with delu-
sions as unreliable autobiographers because their self-
narratives may diverge substantially from the narra-
tives that a third person would construct of them, and
because they may be characterised by internal tension.
People with delusions may give excessive importance
to some events due to disturbances of salience,
include distorted or fabricated memories into the
narrative as a result of confabulation, or construct
narratives that lack internal coherence due to the
conflict between their delusion and some of their
other beliefs.
As I care for the distinction between having a
belief and having a rational belief, so I care for the
distinction between constructing a self-narrative and
constructing a good self-narrative. For the most part,
people with delusions have beliefs and construct
self-narratives. They often have irrational beliefs and
they often construct bad narratives (people without
delusions do that too). There are exceptions: for
instance, in people at advanced stages of dementia
the access to autobiographical memories might be so
seriously compromised that it prevents both the
integration of delusions into a self-narrative and the
construction of a narrative identity. This has impli-
cations for their capacity for autonomous agency
[29] and may be one of the contexts in which the
concepts of ‘in-between believing’, or ‘not-quite-beliefs’
become useful.
In conclusion, the distinction between rational and
irrational beliefs and that between good and bad self-
narratives do not threaten the conception of folk
psychology as a regulative exercise. Moulding is at
work when we interpret others and when we try and
make sense of who we are and what is important for
us. Sometimes it works, and people take what
Tumulty calls ‘corrective action’ or respond to what
Davidson called ‘Socratic tutoring’, and sometimes it
fails. As I argued in “Aren’t Delusions Just Like
Perceptual Illusions?”, the moulding we expect from
our attributions of belief does not always or even
typically fail when we direct our attention towards
people with delusions.
In Defence of Modest Doxasticism About Delusions
Concluding Remarks: The Continuity Thesis
The picture I put forward in the book and I developed
further here in response to my generous critics is a
picture of continuity between delusions and other
irrational beliefs. I find this picture extremely attractive
for a variety of reasons, but some of the commentators
have expressed concerns about it. In particular, the
worry is that by stressing the continuity between
delusions and everyday irrational beliefs (prejudices,
superstitions, etc.) delusions get trivialised.
Murphy [24] maintains that delusions “are attrib-
uted when we run out of the explanatory resources
provided to us by our folk understandings of how the
mind works.” I am not sure this is true of the general
phenomenon of delusions. The content of delusions of
jealousy and persecution—very common delusions—
is often anything but bizarre. Reports are so mundane
that accurate diagnosis may become problematic and
needs to rely on whether other psychotic symptoms
accompany the reports. It is not that strange for me to
come to believe that my partner is cheating on me, or
that my sister is boycotting my efforts to get my
mum to appreciate what I do. Many widespread
delusions have nothing incomprehensible about
them. They are extreme versions of motivated
beliefs or beliefs based on biased evidence that
we all have some experience of.
There are, of course, much more bizarre delusions.
But although their content is puzzling, the way people
talk about the content of their delusions, the tentative
explanations they offer for them, and the behaviour
that these delusions motivate often fit perfectly well
with “our folk understanding of how the mind
works”. If I believe I am dead, I stop eating and lie
motionless in bed. If I believe that President Obama
has a secret crush on me and my friends find this
implausible, then I may attempt to persuade them by
telling them that Obama noticed me at a demonstra-
tion a few years ago and he has been trying to
communicate with me ever since.
Obviously, there are differences between a jealous
person and a person with delusions of jealousy, as
there are differences between someone who is slightly
paranoid and someone with delusions of persecution.
These differences are not necessarily manifested in
the epistemic features of the relevant reports. It may
be irrational to believe in the unfaithfulness of one’s
partner for lack of robust evidence, and this ‘irratio-
nality’ does not demarcate delusions from everyday
beliefs. Rather, the differences are apparent in social
functioning and levels of well-being. Hohwy and
Rajan argue for a forensic aspect of delusions, where
delusions are distinguished from irrational beliefs of a
more mundane sort by poor functioning, and impair-
ments of autonomous agency and moral responsibil-
ity.
[W]e are most prepared to attribute delusions
and initiate clinical arrangements when there is
impairment to decision-making, autonomy and
responsibility. In fact this seems to be the
watershed between delusions and other
delusion-like states, whether we think these
states are beliefs or some other kind of mental
state [3].
I wholeheartedly agree with Hohwy and Rajan that
poor functioning is an important (and often neglected)
aspect of delusions, but I would want to take distance
from the widespread assumption that autonomy and
moral responsibility are necessarily compromised in
people with delusions. As I suggested in “What if Folk
Psychology is Regulative?”, not all people with
delusions lose the capacity to develop self-narratives
and, arguably, this is one of the capacities that underlie
autonomy, as it provides a sense of self that can shape
future decisions and behaviour. Some have defended
the view that psychological well-being ensues from
self-narratives that are coherent and fairly accurate
representations of autobiographical events (e.g., [31]).
In psychiatric disorders accompanied by far-fetched
delusions which are integrated in the self-narrative, a
gap between the story and reality is created. This gap
compromises social functioning, as the way in which
the agent sees herself can be significantly different from
the way in which others see the agent, and her account
of key events might also diverge from the account
provided by others. Whereas the presence of delusions
does not necessarily imply a failure of autonomy and
moral responsibility, it can compromise agents’ success
in shaping their future in a way that is conducive to their
well-being. It can also justify attributions of reduced
accountability for some actions that are motivated by the
delusional beliefs or for actions which would not have
been performed but for the delusion.
Delusions remain a fascinating and largely mysterious
phenomenon, for clinical psychiatrists, philosophers, and
cognitive scientists alike. The modest doxasticist cannot
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hope to shed light on all aspects of delusions, and here I
have largely remained silent on aetiological issues and
on debates about diagnosis and treatment. All I have
attempted to show is that, when it comes to a reasoned
account of the nature of delusions, the modest doxasticist
is not worse off than hermore fashionable opponents.We
can build complexity and explanatory power in a
doxastic account of delusions, as long as we resist the
temptation to idealise beliefs and we give up the project
of finding a demarcation between delusions and every-
day irrational beliefs that is based exclusively on
epistemic grounds.
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